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IN FOCUS |
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by Matthew W. Daus, Esq. |
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andPasqualino “Pat” Russo, Esq. |
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DO YOU KNOW REALLY WHO YOUR TNC DRIVER IS?
TAXICAB, FOR-HIRE, AND TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANY (TNC) DRIVER CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS
For decades, a local television station in New York City has begun its evening news broadcast with a short public service announcement: “It’s 10:00 pm, do you know where your children are?[1] It is a simple and profound question that requests that the viewers pause and think about what they may take for granted, or not question.
With the explosive growth of app companies in providing transportation services through “private” drivers and personal vehicles, the apt question for reflection might be: “You are in a TNC, do you know who your driver is?”[2]
In the last year or so, a nationwide discussion has been sparked regarding the accuracy, reliability, and adequacy of the public safety requirements that are imposed on for-hire vehicle (“FHV”) providers. Much of the debate has centered around whether the breadth and scope of driver vetting requirements imposed on drivers providing services through new transportation network companies, or “TNCs,” are comparable to those vetting requirements that have been established for traditional for-hire vehicle providers.
This discussion is compounded by the fact that in several jurisdictions TNCs are operating “rogue,” or outside of the regulatory framework which has many consumer rights advocates and law enforcement officials questioning whether TNCs are doing enough to protect the riding public.
We initiated a comprehensive review of available background checks, and then examined the types of checks in use to vet for-hire drivers in a variety of jurisdictions. Since there are differing standards for the types of checks in use by jurisdictions, there are legitimate concerns as to how these varying standards put the riding public at risk.
Based on our review of the litigation and legal questions that have been raised concerning current practices for examining the criminal histories of driver applicants, as well as the potential for disparate reporting of arrests of licensees, we sought to determine the “best practices” and recommendations for ensuring that those who drive the public meet basic requirements in the local jurisdictions.
Our study was presented and peer reviewed by a blue ribbon panel of academics, criminalists, law enforcement officials, as well as forensic and security experts who reviewed the study, provided comments and, ultimately, provided their approval for the conclusions reached from the research.[3] The complete report can be obtained by e-mailing mdaus@windelsmarx.com.
I. Background Checks 101
We began our review with a primer concerning criminal background checks. It describes for the novice what it means to “print” someone. To print someone means to provide details about the mechanism by which biometric “prints” come back to the entity requesting a background check.
For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to differentiate between a “background check” and a “criminal background check.” A background check is typically a search of publicly available records based on a person’s name, a process that may be done when applying for housing, employment, and, historically, for immigration purposes.
A. The FBI Process
At the FBI, the National Name Check program, which dates back to the Eisenhower Administration and Executive Order 10450, involves a search of the FBI’s Central Records System Universal Index for any appearance of the name of the individual, as well as close variations, multiple spellings, and permutations of that name.[4] In 2013, the FBI conducted more than 3 million name checks.[5]
When the name checks are submitted, the names are electronically checked against the FBI’s Universal Index (“UNI”). The searches seek all instances of the individual’s name appearing in both main files and reference files. A main file contains the name of an individual who is the subject of an FBI investigation, whereas a reference file contains the name of someone who is mentioned in an FBI investigation.[6]
The majority of name checks submitted are electronically checked and returned to the submitting agency as having “no record” within 48-72 hours. A “no record” indicates that the FBI’s UNI database contains no identifiable information regarding a particular individual.[7]
A secondary manual search of residuals from the original run is conducted within 10 days and identifies an additional number of names as a “no record” response. The remaining name checks (usually about 7 percent of the name checks originally submitted) are identified as possibly being the subject of an FBI record. If the information is not identified with the supplemental request, the request is closed as a “no record” and the requesting agency is notified as such.[8]
The average time required to retrieve and review an FBI record for possible information related to a name check request is case specific. It depends on:
- the number of files an analyst must obtain which is dictated by the number of “hits” on a name,
- the location and availability of those files, and
- the amount of information contained in a file.
Once an analyst receives the file or the pertinent information contained in a file, the analyst must review it for possible information related to the name check request.[9]
The fingerprints themselves are stored in a database called an Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (“AFIS”). AFIS is used to store the templates which are the numerical representations of the fingerprints and for searching. AFIS is also used to catalogue the type of fingerprints based on the shape of the swirls.
Today’s AFIS systems work with multiple servers to provide speeds upwards of millions per second. Prior to AFIS and the technology it introduced, only 3.3 fingerprint cards per hour were able to be processed manually by forensic specialists. Most law enforcement and government agencies, criminal and civil agencies, use AFIS systems for identification purposes making fingerprints the go-to biometric when it comes to criminal background checks.
The FBI maintains the largest AFIS with more than 100 million criminal and civil fingerprint records. According to the agency’s web site, a criminal search is processed in 27 minutes on average whereas a civil applicant search is processed in an average of one hour and 12 minutes.
Civil applicant searches are those conducted on behalf of people applying for various jobs and licenses. More than 61 million fingerprint searches were conducted during fiscal year 2010.[10]
Fingerprint error rates are less than 1%.[11] A new system called Next Generation IAFIS was put in place in 2014 to support multiple types of biometrics and increase the speed and efficiency of the processing.
All states and many counties/regions and large cities also maintain their own AFIS systems which tend to contain different data sets. This is due to the fact that some information is not needed or accepted at the higher level, and most crime scene prints are identified to criminals in the same geographic area. It is faster to search smaller, local databases.
B. Rap Back Services
One of the more interesting capabilities of using fingerprints for the criminal history check is the ability to automatically submit for renewal or for an agency to receive automatic updates or an altered criminal history status. This is known as a “Rap Back Service” that provides the agency with notification of criminal, and in some cases, civil activity that occurs after the initial processing of the criminal history.
The benefit of the Rap Back Service is to provide agencies notice of subsequent activity in between the renewal cycles of the license. The second way to accomplish this goal is to store the applicant fingerprints at the taxi regulatory authority and resubmit the fingerprints for the full criminal history check on a regular basis.
C. How Do Name Checks Measure Up?
A survey conducted in 2004 by the Society for Human Resources Advancement among their membership found that fifty-three percent (53%) of respondents reported that they, either sometimes or always, find inconsistencies in the criminal history check. As the report states, “these numbers do not account for the severity of the inconsistency, but are nonetheless eye opening and should be kept in mind by organizations when deciding whether to verify applicant information.”[12]
Given the number of potential “misses” due to inaccurate information, the true number of applicants with criminal histories is likely to be higher. In fact, the FBI has previously reported the annual hit rate on civil submissions is 12%.[13]
This figure was also verified in a 1999 study conducted by an Attorney General Task Force in which name only and fingerprint checks were conducted on more than 90,000 state employees and state license applicants which verified fingerprint records on people who stated they had a clear criminal history.[14]
On a national basis, this rate would equate to approximately 900,000 checks per year being identified to individuals with existing criminal history records. More alarming, this number is based on the FBI database alone. State and local databases contain much more information that may be useful when conducting a thorough criminal history check.
Moreover, there is a concern that solely submitting a name check without a corresponding biometric does create this false sense of security that enough has been done. For example, the Terrorist Screening Center conducted an exercise to verify the “hits” on a terrorism watch list. Initially, the name check found 53.4% of the names resulted in a positive match. Then, when those same checks were examined further, it was found that 43% of the persons were not, in fact, the person who had been initially identified through a name check only.[15]
It is more troubling that, according to recent media reports, for only $5 one could obtain access to a usable name, credit card number and expiration date, social security and mother’s maiden name.[16] Again, the only way to distinguish between this stolen identity and the actual person is the biometric.
Photo: Elena Michaels
II. For-Hire Ground Transportation Regulation – Driver Criminal Background Checks
Based on our review of nine (9) sample jurisdictions, we found that there are three categories of how jurisdictions conduct applicant background checks:
(1) jurisdictions have the same standards for all FHV drivers;
(2) jurisdictions have different standards for TNC drivers; or
(3) jurisdictions have “no standards” in that the TNCs self regulate the driver background checks.
To date, TNC specific regulations have been adopted in approximately twenty jurisdictions:
- We reviewed the regulations imposed in New York City and Houston, Texas, where no special categories for TNCs exist and traditional FHVs and TNCs are subject to the same body of regulations.
- We also examined processes for traditional FHV regulations with the new TNC regulations in California; Chicago, Illinois; Colorado; the District of Columbia; and Seattle, Washington.
- Finally, we analyzed and described the different standards that are set by the TNCs themselves in jurisdictions like Boston, Massachusetts and Miami-Dade County, Florida, where TNCs are operating entirely outside of the regulatory framework.
For these jurisdictions, we identified the differences in process and oversight, and identify the gaps. For each jurisdiction, we also researched the legal standard for review and the legal guidance to the regulators as to how to determine the fitness of an applicant for a ground transportation driver’s license.
Based on the unambiguous and uniform standards for all classes of drivers, we found that the New York City process rightly stands apart in comparison to the other jurisdictions. The New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission (the “TLC”) requires the finger imaging of applicants. New York City submits those fingerprints to the state agency that can cross reference the fingerprints against a criminal database. This standard operating procedure provides for an efficient and expeditious result for the TLC for all of its applicants.
If there is a “flag” or a “hit” on the prints for a criminal conviction, the TLC may request from the applicant, through a letter, e-mail, telephone call or personal interview, additional information[17] to analyze the fitness of the driver applicant to be licensed in light of the “good moral character” standard.
These actions are undertaken with guidance from State law that involves a nexus between the conviction and driving. Specifically, Section 752 of the NYS Corrections Law prohibits applications for any license or employment, or employment or license held by an individual to be denied or acted upon adversely:
- by reason of the individual’s having been previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses, or
- by reason of a finding of lack of “good moral character” when such finding is based upon the fact that the individual has previously been convicted of one or more criminal offenses, unless:
(1) there is a direct relationship between one or more of the previous criminal offenses and the specific license or employment sought or held by the individual; or
(2) the issuance or continuation of the license or the granting or continuation of the employment would involve an unreasonable risk to property, or
(3) to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public.[18]
If the applicant disagrees with the determination, the applicant may file a legal action if ultimately denied licensure by the TLC.[19]
For those who have a license, the fingerprint on file may also be cross matched if there is an arrest of the TLC licensee. New York State’s Division of Criminal Justice Services will report this information to the TLC for a potential licensing suspension action, usually within 24-48 hours. Again, these actions are governed by the stated standards for revocation, and procedures for fitness revision.[20]
III. Criminal Background Check Litigation & Legal Issues
The advent of TNCs has raised several public safety and consumer protection issues that are currently being litigated across the nation. There are numerous claims, although many of the overarching theories of these claims overlap.
Of particular relevance to this study, the issues of whether the criminal background checks relied upon by TNCs are:
(i) adequate;
(ii) violate a driver’s civil rights; and
(iii) unfairly allow for TNCs to avoid the same standards as other for-hire transportation companies;
are being fiercely litigated in lawsuits across the country.
In September 2014, the San Francisco (“SF”) and Los Angeles (“LA”) district attorneys (“DAs” or “prosecutors”) commenced an investigation of Uber, Lyft and Sidecar claiming that the TNCs were operating illegally and warning them that legal action could follow if they did not make major changes.[21]
The offices of Jackie Lacey (“LA DA”), and George Gascón (“SF DA”) conducted a joint investigation into the companies and found a number of practices that violate California law.[22]
The prosecutors say the practices represent “a continuing threat to consumers and the public.”[23] The DAs allege that all three companies misled customers by claiming their background checks of drivers screen out anyone who has committed driving violations, including DUIs, as well as sexual assault and other criminal offenses. The DAs alleged that these claims are “patently untrue.”[24]
One of the incidents that prompted the investigation was a criminal complaint in June 2014, in which San Francisco DA George Gascón charged an Uber driver of striking a passenger. The Uber driver had passed the company’s background check, but court records showed he had previously been convicted of felony drug dealing and misdemeanor battery. Gascón has demanded that the companies remove all statements from their mobile apps, websites and other publications that imply their background checks reveal a driver’s complete criminal history.
Lyft ultimately settled the DAs’ allegations and agreed to pay up to $500,000 in civil fines. As part of the settlement, Lyft must, among other things, remove language that claims its background checks are industry leading. The lawmakers’ negotiations with Sidecar are ongoing.[25]
Uber, on the other hand, refused to cooperate with the prosecutors. As a result, in December 2014, the DAs’ offices filed a complaint against Uber for alleged unlawful business practices and allegations that Uber misleads the public about the safety of its service and overcharges passengers.[26]
The suit asks for, inter alia, an injunction to stop Uber from stating its background checks are “industry leading” since Uber does not include fingerprint checks.[27]
“Background checks that don’t include fingerprints can’t be sure to be tied to the right person, and therefore can’t be secure,” Gascón said.[28] However, because the California rules allow for non-fingerprint checks of TNC drivers, prosecutors are somewhat limited in their ability to address this issue until new rulemaking takes place.
“At the end of the day, you cannot conduct the most comprehensive background check possible if the information you have obtained has nothing to do with the person that is signing on with you to be a driver,” Gascón said. “It is completely worthless.”[29]
TNC rules and regulations do not fully address certain anti-discrimination laws with respect to driver background checks, where persons with a criminal record are discriminated against solely on the basis of their criminal past. On April 25, 2012, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued its Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”).[30]
Title VII does not regulate the acquisition of criminal history information. However, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“FCRA”), does establish several procedures for employers to follow when they obtain criminal history information from third party consumer reporting agencies.[31] In addition, some state laws provide protections to individuals related to criminal history inquiries by employers.[32]
IV. Rights Concerns
As a brief summary, Title VII prohibits:
(i) employers from treating people with similar criminal records differently because of some Title VII protected classification including race, sex, and origin;
(ii) employers from using policies or practices that screen individuals based on criminal history information if:
(a) they are individuals part of a protected class under Title VII protected, e.g., based on race or ethnicity, and
(b) they do not help the employer accurately decide if the person is likely to be a responsible, reliable, or safe employee.[33]
With regard to ridesharing companies, Uber Technologies, Inc. has recently faced increased pressure from rejected drivers over their allegedly illegal background checks. Following a rejected application for a position as a driver for UberX, a Boston resident and former Uber-Black service driver filed a suit against Uber [34] alleging that the company’s hiring decision was based on a criminal record showing up on a background check when he applied for the new job, hereinafter referred to as the “Mohamed Suit”.
According to the suit, Uber never notified the applicant of any background check policies, nor provided him with a copy of the relevant report. The suit accuses Uber of impermissibly using consumer reports to make hiring decisions in violation of federal and state credit reporting laws, and not providing appropriate disclosures about the background check process.
The suit follows less than a month after a Massachusetts resident sued Uber in Massachusetts state court making similar allegations regarding Uber’s background checks,[35] hereinafter referred to as the “Goldberg Suit”. Both suits name Rasier LLC and Hirease LLC as additional defendants. Rasier LLC is an Uber subsidiary that insures the company’s drivers, and Hirease LLC provides the background screening services for Uber.
Moreover, there are a number of lawsuits in which government agencies or municipalities are being sued for violating state and/or federal constitutional rights that require laws to be enforced equally among similarly situated persons or businesses.
As new regulations are introduced to address the advent of TNCs, cases have been filed which argue that because TNCs are not a new/innovative service, but rather a re-packaged traditional transportation service, the new laws are treating TNCs differently than, and to the detriment of, traditional for-hire vehicle companies.
Plaintiffs in these cases allege that the government is not adequately or equitably enforcing its laws against TNCs, laws that are equally applicable to all transportation companies. Plaintiffs in Taxicab Paratransit Association of California v. Public Utilities Commission of the State of California,[36] the “TPAC case”, and Illinois Transportation Trade Association et al., v. City of Chicago,[37] allege that the government is not adequately or equitably enforcing its laws against TNCs, laws that are equally applicable to all transportation companies.
The advent of ridesharing apps has raised several public safety and consumer protection issues. The provision of for-hire transportation services by persons who are required to meet a differing standard with respect to background and diving history checks, or in some cases, no standard at all to provide for-hire transportation service, has given rise to a plethora of criminal allegations and legal complaints against TNC drivers and in some cases, the TNCs themselves.
On April 12, 2015 the Massachusetts chapter of the National Organization for Women (“NOW”) has announced its concern for quality of background checks after the reports of recent Uber drivers being arrested for alleged assaults against their passengers.
V. Biometric Checks are the Safer and More Accurate Standard
The evidence is clear. Biometric based background checks are the only way to provide maximum assurance on the accuracy of a criminal history background check. The Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, (“IAFIS”), is a national fingerprint and criminal history system that responds to requests 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to help local, state, and federal partners solve and prevent crime and catch criminals and terrorists.[38]
IAFIS provides automated fingerprint search capabilities, latent search capability, electronic image storage, and electronic exchange of fingerprints and responses.[39]
Other than fingerprints, IAFIS also includes corresponding criminal histories; mug shots; scars and tattoo photos; physical characteristics like height, weight, and hair and eye color; and aliases.[40]
Since 1924, the FBI has been the national repository for fingerprints and related criminal history data.[41] Today, the FBI’s master criminal fingerprint file contains the records of approximately 47 million individuals while their civil file represents approximately 30.7 million individuals. (The civil file predominantly contains fingerprints of individuals who have served or are serving in the U.S. military or have been or are employed by the federal government.[42]
Employers request what is known as an “Identity History Summary”, which is a listing of certain information taken from fingerprint submissions retained by the FBI in connection with arrests and, in some instances, federal employment, naturalization, or military service.[43]
We presented our findings to a select group of panelists who have reviewed the available evidence and determined that the varying standards for background checks required by TNC jurisdictions, as well as the self regulatory model, fall short of the regulatory requirement to protect the riding public.
In sum, the use of biometrics by transportation regulators in the driver vetting process provides efficient, cost effective, and comprehensive results for those regulators to determine which drivers meet the standards for licensure. Further, equal standards are required, regardless of the class or type of license being sought by the driver applicant.
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Photo: Elena Michaels
VI. Recommended Best Regulatory Practices
In summary, the recommendations are not intended in any way to discourage the use of private criminal background checks by private companies or employers in general, or as an additional voluntary measure on the part of transportation companies in addition to government administered biometric fingerprinting.
Our recommended best practices for conducting criminal background checks and making licensing decisions for all for-hire ground transportation drivers (taxicabs, limousines, liveries, black cars, TNCs, etc.), are as follows:
- Government must make the licensing decision: the government transportation regulator responsible for licensing drivers should set driver fitness licensing standards via rulemaking or legislative process, and should make the decisions on who to license or not to license. Private companies must not be allowed to self regulate and to exclusively make these decisions without any oversight;
- Government, directly or through a certified channeling agency, is responsible for fingerprinting: the government transportation regulator or a sister governmental agency should administer a biometric based fingerprint check. Private sector certified channeling agencies and fingerprint service providers can provide a biometric based fingerprint check but must not be allowed to preempt government oversight of the process;
- Biometric fingerprints preferred: the government transportation regulator should mandate the use of biometric fingerprints, not name checks that are less accurate;
- Electronic fingerprinting preferred: the government transportation regulator or other government agency or private vendor acting on its behalf, should preferably use electronic digital fingerprint impressions (Live Scan) instead of manual ink based fingerprinting of applicants;
- Specific criminal convictions can be a bar to licensure: legislation and/or rulemaking can identify certain criminal convictions that have a direct nexus to the act of driving for hire such that a conviction can serve as either a lifetime ban on obtaining a license, or for a specific number of years, e.g., driving while intoxicated, or serious felonies such as homicide, rape and armed robbery;
- Licensing decisions should be based on specific standards that may apply to any misdemeanor or felony convictions: legislation and/or regulations, in addition to licensing preclusion for specific crimes, should set forth specific overall fitness standards, such as “good moral character” or “protection of public health and safety”. In so doing, government transportation regulators can possess and exercise their discretion to analyze and bar licensure for drivers convicted of any crime that may bear a nexus to the licensed activity when applying said standard;
- Compliance with anti-discrimination laws must take place: those states that have anti-discrimination laws that set forth substantive criteria and procedures to evaluate and consider the nexus between prior convictions and licensed activity, as well as any evidence of rehabilitation, must be complied with. Transportation licensing decisions and processes must be tailored to accommodate such laws where applicable;
- Drivers should have the opportunity to be heard and present evidence as part of licensing procedures evaluating criminal convictions: government transportation regulators should put into place a process so that license applicants for driver licenses may offer evidence as to whether they were or were not convicted of certain crimes in all instances, as well as evidence of rehabilitation or a lack of nexus to licensed activity where there is fitness decision discretion and no licensing preclusion for specific crimes;
- Rap-back service preferred to monitor licensed driver conduct: the government transportation regulator should store and maintain, in a highly secure and confidential manner within accepted industry and government protocols, criminal conviction information for license applicants who subsequently become licensed, for the duration of such license term.
The transportation regulator should be notified of the arrest and conviction of licensed drivers for any crimes committed so that the agency may elect to either suspend or seek revocation of such license following a conviction, fitness hearing or procedure, after an opportunity to be heard is presented;
- “One standard for all drivers” in conducting and evaluating criminal backgrounds of taxi, limo and TNCs applicants: all laws and rules that prescribe or detail criminal background checks processes, methods and criteria or licensing standards, should apply equally to all licensed for-hire vehicle drivers, however state or local regulations or laws classify them – limousines, taxicabs, TNCs, liveries, black cars, etc…, to ensure equal protection of the laws and no arbitrary, capricious or conflicting standards without a rational basis.
In the event that state and local legislatures continue to pass legislation creating separate TNC licensing categories, it is recommended that the foregoing best regulatory practices be adhered to and consistent with the crafting of such legislation.
Historically, the regulation of for-hire ground transportation has been conducted at the local level and sometimes at the state level. Given the sovereign rights of states, and by delegation municipal governments, to regulate such services within their borders pursuant to promoting the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens, there will undoubtedly be discretion to develop different licensing standards, procedures, and approaches for drivers.
These recommended best practices preserve the ability for local and state regulators to protect passengers, pedestrians and other drivers in accordance with existing laws, and to provide for their own regulatory flexibility without compromising their regulatory structure.
These best practice recommendations do not seek to preclude or discourage private TNC, taxicab or limousine operators from going above and beyond these best practices to conduct driver name background checks “in addition” to government fingerprinting. It does not preclude operators to otherwise develop further standards for monitoring driver conduct and performance beyond basic safety and conduct regulations. Extra levels of safety and accountability are beneficial to the public interest and should be encouraged and promoted.
As the controversy surrounding TNCs continues and regulatory issues are being debated, this report will hopefully provide policy makers, the media, the riding and general public with both factual information and expert opinions as to best regulatory practices.
This report’s goal is to enlighten the public about existing, new and proposed laws, pending litigation, the purpose for and systems for regulating, the accuracy measure of various criminal conviction background checks, as well as the considered opinions of experts in the field with extensive experience and understanding of the issues from both a forensic, law enforcement and transportation perspective.
It is our hope that there will be “one better and safer standard for all drivers,” as a result of our extensive research, work and analysis of this issue. Maybe, you will not have to ask, “Who is driving me?”
1. WNYW-TV New York.
2. This article is based on our report, “One Standard for All: Criminal Background Checks for Taxicab, For-Hire, and Transportation Network Company (“TNC”) Drivers.” The report was published in May 2015 through John Jay College of Criminal Justice’s Masters of Public Administration program.
3. The panel includes: Hon. Michael A. L. Balboni (former Deputy Secretary for Public Safety for New York State, former New York State Senator and Chair of the New York State Senate Committee on Veterans, Homeland Security and Military Affairs); Professor William J. DiVello (former Executive Director, Office of Integrity and Oversight for the District of Columbia Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”), whose responsibilities included performing background investigations on CFO employees); Professor Lawrence Kobilinsky (Professor and Chairperson of the Department of Sciences, John Jay College of Criminal Justice); and Professor Philip Zisman (Executive Director, The Association of Inspectors General, former Inspector General for the City of Yonkers). Special recognition is made to Frances Zelazny, a subject matter expert with more than 15 years of experience in the biometrics field.
4. http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/name-checks/namechecks
5. Id.
6. http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/name-checks/name-checks-faqs
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis
11. The FBI has reported that the Advanced Fingerprint Identification Technology (“AFIT”), completed February 25, 2011, has replaced the Automated Fingerprint Identification System AFIS segment of the IAFIS. With advanced matching algorithms, the AFIT increased identification performance and machine matching accuracy from 92 percent to more than 99 percent. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/cjis-link/october%202014/ngi-officially-replaces-iafisyields-more-search-options-and-investigative-leads-and-increased-identification-accuracy
12.http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Documents/Reference%20and%20Background
%20Checking%20Survey%20Report.pdf
13. http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/033004kirkpatrick.htm
14. http://www.search.org/files/pdf/III_Name_Check.pdf
15. Based on audit of Terrorist Screening Center in 2007. Source: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg48979/html/CHRG-110hhrg48979.htm
16. http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/08/26/your-identity-is-worth-5-on-the-black-market/
17. http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/fitness_rules_intro_%208_2_11.pdf
18. NYS Corrections Law, §752
19. NYS Civil Procedure Laws and Rules, §7803
20. Title 35 of the Rules of the City of New York, , §54-08 (taxi drivers) and§55-08 (for-hire vehicle drivers)
21. http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/09/25/san-francisco-los-angeles-das-warn-ride-service-companies-uber-lyft-sidecar-to-halt-illegal-practices/
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. http://www.cnet.com/news/california-sues-ride-sharing-service-uber-settles-with-rival-lyft/
26. See The People of the State of California v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al., Case No. CGC 14-543120 (Ca Sup. Ct., City and County of San Francisco); See also http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-lyft-20141209-story.html.
A federal consumer class action was also filed asserting the same allegations as the DAs’ lawsuit. See Philliben, et al. v. Uber Tech., Inc., et al, Case No. 4:14-cv-05615-DMR (N.D. Ca)
27. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/09/sf-la-district-attorneys-sue-uber-and-lyft-over-misleading-business-violations/2/
28. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/09/sf-la-district-attorneys-sue-uber-and-lyft-over-misleading-business-violations/
29. Id.
30. http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/qa_arrest_conviction.cfm
31. http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/qa_arrest_conviction.cfm
32. http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/qa_arrest_conviction.cfm
33. See http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_arrest_conviction.cfm
34. Mohamed v. Uber Technologies Inc. et. al., No. 14-5200, complaint filed (N.D. Cal., S.F. Div. Nov. 24, 2014).
35. Goldberg v. Uber Techs. et al., No. 14-3388, 2014 WL 5474945, complaint filed (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County Oct. 30, 2014).
36. Case No. C076432 (Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District)
37. Case No. 1:14-cv-00827 (N.D. Illinois)
38. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis
39. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis
40. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis
41. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks
42. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks
43. Id.